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uncertainty is influenced by the individual's ability to adapt through self-protection. We conclude that the
total value of reducing the supply uncertainty of a natural resource is reflected in both the individual's option
price payments for collective provision and in his willingness-to-pay for adaptation through self-protection.
By ignoring adaptive self-protection, traditional benefit-cost analysis has systematically underestimated the
total value of environmental resources that are characterized by uncertain supplies.
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Jusc as ecology has benefited from the economic theory of optimization, 
economics can benefit from the ecological theory of adaptation. We examine 
the impact of short-term, nongenetic adaptive self-protection on the values 
individuals attach to uncertain prospective environmental resources. We 
demonstrate that collective provision of reductions in supply unce~tainty does 
not necessitate a positive option value, given that uncertainty is influenced 
by the individual's ability to adapt through selt-protec:ion. We conclude 
that the total value of reducing the supply uncertainty of a natural resource 
is reflected in both the individual's option price payments for collective 
provision and in his willingness-to-pay for adaptation through self-
protection. By ignoring adaptive self-protection, traditional benefit-cost 
analysis has systematically underestimated the total value of environmental 
resources that are characterized by uncertain supplies. 
INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between private self-protection opportunities and the 
value of public provision of resources in uncertain supply has rarely been 
explored in environmental economics. The most significant example of this 
inattention is arguably the economic literature on option value. Weisbrod 
(1964) expanded the scope of benefit-cost analysis by examining the. relevance 
that uncertainty has for measures of economic well-being. He argued that a 
complete analysis must account for option value, the difference between the 
maximum a risk averse individual would be willing to pay to retain the option 
of future availability of an environmental resource (option price) and 
expected consumer surplus. Expected consumer surplus is the difference 
between what a consumer is willing to pay for a gooG or a state of the world 
and what he expects he will have to pay. Option value is essentially a risk 
premium attached to provision of future access to a desired resource. A risk 
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averse individual may be willing to pay an _amount (the option value) above his 
expected consumer surplus for the prospect of seeing, say, a wild species like 
the grizzly bear or humpback whale, or ot visiting a natural ecosystem like 
the Everglades. By acknowledging the plausible value of claims to future 
access, Weisbrod (1964) identified a nonuser value that was a previously 
ignored facet of preferences for environmental resources.V Most of the 
abundant environmental economics literature on option value has sought to 
establish whether it is negative, positive, or zero, which would respectively 
imply that the traditional measures of the economic value of collective 
efforts at environmental protection are positively, negatively, or not at all 
biased, e.g., Schmalensee (1972), Bishop et al. (1982), Brookshire et al. 
(1983), and Plummer and Hartman (1986). It is generally agreed that the sign 
of option value is indeterminant for a risk averse consumer. According to 
this literature, a major exception is that option value will be positive when 
demand is certain and supply uncertainty is eliminated. 
The option value literature, however, has invariably ignored adaptation, 
a key behavioral trait long recognized by ecologists. At least since Darwin 
(1859), ecologists have tried to understand how plant and animal behavior 
adapts to its environment. Adaptation can be genetic (long-run) or ic can be 
based on learning and experience (short-run), though the ability to learn will 
have some genetic basis {Barnard (1983)]. For example, predation constitutes 
one of the most severe everyday pressures that most plants and animals face. 
Both expend considerable energy resources in acts that increase the likelihood 
of survival (Hannon (1979; Caraco and Lima (1985)]. That is, plants and 
animals adapt by engaging in self-protection, a set of acts that reduce the 
likelihood of an undesirable event or that reduce its severity. Plants employ 
a wide variety of self-protection devices, including genetic variations, 
premature abscission, resource sinks, inhibitor proteins, and immune bodies 
such as granules, fibers, membrane fragments, and viruses [Morgan and Hamilton 
(1980); Dirzo (1984)]. Similarly, animals self-protect by withdrawing to 
cover, distracting and diverting, or feigning death, as well as by chemical 
defenses, startled responses, and warning signals [Edmunds (1974); Harvey and 
Greenwood (1978); Krebs and Davies (1981)]. 
The theory of adaptati~n is transferable to human behavior wich respecc 
to environmental resources in uncertain supply. Although both shore-run 
[e.g., Viscusi (1979)] and long-run [e.g., Alchian (1950)] adaptations are 
well represented in most areas of economics, the option value literature has 
consistently assumed that the individual treats the probability of resource 
supply as exogenous; i.e., his short-run ability co -adapt by privately 
influencing an uncertain outcome is presumed to be predetermined or 
nonexistent. Exogeneity is by no means an obvious assumption and it is not 
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difficult to find perfectly reasonable, everyday human counter~examples. When 
a potable water supply is uncertain, individuals often choose to adapt by 
providing self-protection in the form of bottled water, water filters, or 
both. Other examples of short-~un adaptation through self-protection include 
purchases at air purifiers and conditioners to increase the likelihood of 
acceptable air quality, and the construction of air vents and isolation panels 
to reduce the likelihood of radon contamination [Smith and Johnson (1988)]. 
These and similar examples conform to what Mohring and Boyd (1971) term impure 
public goads which have benefits that are partially rivalrous or excludable. 
This paper makes an important and neglected point. Humans adapt. This 
influences their valuations of uncertain environmental resources. Given 
short-run adaptation (self-protection), we demonstrate that collective efforts 
to eliminate supply uncertainty need not have a positive option value. An 
individual- who can adapt via self-protection will have a wider variety of 
choices before and after the resolution of uncertainty. Self-protection 
therefore reduces his option price for collective provision and thus makes it 
possible that he will attach a trivial or a negative option value co 
collective provision. Therefore, any concept of ex ante valuation must 
include both voluntary self-protection and collective option price payments if 
the actual economic benefits of a nonmarketed environmental resource are not 
to be underestimated. Conrad (1986) has made a similar point. However, he 
does not directly address the impact of self-protection upon option value, nor 
does he allow the individual to influence collective provision through an 
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option price payment. Gallagher and Smith (1985) and Smith (1985) refer to 
changes in probabilities in combination with individual adjustment 
opportunities, but they do not treat self-induced changes in the probabilities 
of alternative states as an adjustment opportunity. 
SELF-PROTECTION AND OPTION VALUE 
Most individuals perceive that they can exercise substantial control 
over their lives, including the ·ability to do something about many of the 
uncertainties which they face [Perlmuter and Monty (1979); Stallen and Tomas 
(1984)]. One form of control is the use of market insurance to redistribute 
income and wealth toward undesirable outcomes. Given actuarially fair 
insurance and decreasing marginal utility o~ income, insurance would be 
acquired in an amount such that the individual is indifferent as to which 
state of nature ultimately occurs. No matter what the realized state of 
nature, the ex post compensation which the insurance supplies maintains the ex 
ante utility level. Questions of ex ante versus ex post valuation therefore 
become irrelevant. 
With incomplete markets, consumers are not fully insured, and ex ante 
willingness to pay thus becomes relevant. Since complete markecs rarely if 
ever exist for environmental resources, ex ante measures are especially 
appropriate for these goods. It is these measures that explain the 
individual's choices. If the individual is provided ehe opportunity to make 
option price payments for environmental resources, the efficiency with which 
he can allocate his wealth among states of nature is enhanced [Cook and Graham 
(1977)]. An ex ante value measure then refers to the mi~imum expenditures the 
consumer must make in order to maintain his expected utility when the 
probability of a futu~e state of nature changes. However, nowhere does the 
option value literature explicitly recognize that individuals can adapt by 
adopting what Ehrlich and Becker (1972) term acts of self-protection, thereby 
influencing the probability that a state will occur. 
For simplicity, consider an individual under a given liability regime 
who is uncertain about which of two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
states of nature will occur. This individual, whose preferences and income 
are independent of these states, makes an atemporal choice in a von Neumann-
Norgenstern framework where his expected utility is an increasing, strictly 
concave, and differentiable function of his certain income, Y, and an 
environmental resource, Q. Thus, in the absence of self-protection or an 
option payment, expected utility, EU, is 
7 
EU ( 1 ) 
where E is an expectations operator, 7r 0 (0 ~ 7r 0 ~ 1) is the individual's 
initial degree of belief that level Q 1 of the environmental resource will 
occur, 1-1r 0 is his degree of belief in the occurrence of Q 2 , and U (Y, Q 1) > 
U(Y,Q 1 ). Given concavity of the utility function, option price, OF, is then 
that ex ante sure payment which holds expected utility constant when the 
probability of Q 1 being realized has changed; that is, following Freeman 
(1985): 
7W(Y-OP,Q lJ + (l-7r)U(Y-OP,Q 1 ) = 7r 0 U(Y,Q lJ + (l-7r 0 )U(Y,Q 1 ), (2) 
where 7r > 7r 0 • In accordance with the traditional collective option value 
literature, the payment of OP "secures" access to the benefits of the 
predetermined probability, 7r, of the desirable state, Q l {Smith (1985), p. 
304)]. Typically, the desirable state is represented as a pure public good 
which is independent of any individual's actions, and which che relevant 
collective agency finances by sure payments from everyone. 
3 
More realistically, one might view the individual as one of a collection 
of potential beneficiaries, any one of whom by increasing the size of a 
voluntary option price payment to a collective agency can enhance the 
probability of Q 1 • Similarly, the individual might improve his probability 
of privately commanding Q 1 by adopting assorted self-protection strategies. 
The collective and private alternatives are unlikely to be perfect ex ante 
substitutes tor him, if only because of differences in his ability to 
influence the probability of the desirable state. For example, contributions 
to the construction of a public water treatment plant might make it more 
likely that everyone will get "safe" drinking water. Alternatively, an 
individual could accomplish the same end for himself alone by purchasing a 
water filter for his home. 
The current theoretical and empirical option value literature has not 
explicitly recognized the valuation implications of private substitution 
possibilities. Government action is held to be the only possible way to 
finance increased probability of provision [see Greenley et al. (1981), 
Brookshire et al. (1983), Walsh et al. (1984), and Smith and Desvousges 
(1987), for example]. No framework for incorporating self-protection is 
evident in these analyses. 
When opportunities are available to adapt by making probability-
influencing collective option price payments or to engage in self-protection, 
the left-hand-side of (2) can be rewritten as 
{3) 
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where s is self-protection expenditures, and ~(•) is differentiable and 
increasing in s and OP. The individual then selects s ~ 0 and OP ~ 0 to 
maximize (3). Both private self-protection and collective option price are ex 
ante payments that maintain expected utility. Defining W = Y-OP-s, the 
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The terms (a~;as)[•J and (a~;aoP)[•] in (4) and (5) represent the 
(4) 
(5) 
expected marginal benefits of adaptation to be had increasing the probability 
of Oj. The au;aw terms are the marginal costs of adaptive self-protection in 
terms of reduced income. If the expected marginal benefits of the probability 
change equal the marginal costs of s or OP, it follows that s and OF will be 
selected so chat 
a~ 
= 
aop · ( 6) 
In this case, an interior solution to the individual's utility maximization 
problem is implied: the individual makes a payment for the collectively 
supplied good and purchases some private self-protection as well, (s, OF) = 
(+, +). The relative amounts of collective option payments and private self-
protection expenditures that he chooses will depend upon their relative 
marginal productivities in securing increases in ~. 
JQ 
As note.d by Barnard ( 1983 J, the manner in which a species adapts depends 
on effectiveness. If a particular protection activity is especially effective 
at reducing a natural selection pressure, then one should expect organisms to 
engage in this activity prior to using other defensive activities. Similarly, 
if self-protection is more effective than collective provision of the 
resource, then the individual will choose to self-protect. Thus it 0~/0S > 
0~/00P tor all feasible (s, Op) pairs, then a boundary solution would be 
obtained in which the optimal pair has the form (s, OP) = (+, OJ. This 
implies that private self-protection expenditures are positive but that the 
option price payment for collective provision is zero. If the individual can 
always produce a given probability increase at less cosc by adapting through 
self-protection than by making an option price payment, he will do so. 
Basically, by introducing adaptive self-protection in an option value 
discussion, one allows the individual to substitute between own and collective 
provision of a desirable state of nature. Because it expands the consumer's 
choice set and thereby improves his ability to allocate risk among states, an 
opportunity to self-protect reduces his demand tor collective provision of the 
desirable state but increases his overall demand for that state. Since 
discrepancies in utilities are reduced among states, collective option prices, 
as is evident from expression (5), must fall. The value of altering the 
uncertainty is reflected in the individual's voluntary collective option 
payments and in his willingness to pay for self-protection. Consequently, any 
concept of option value which refers only to collective provision may result 
in underestimates of the actual ex ante value that individuals attach to the 
prospective provision of the environmental resource. 
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If the availability of self-protection can reduce option pr~ce, chen ~c 
can also impact option value. Recall the definition of option value, OV: 
OV = OP- E(CS). ( 7) 
As in Cook and Graham (1977), E(CS), expected consumer surplus, is the 
consumer's ex ante benefit from having an entitlement to the desirable state, 
where we define compensating consumer surplus as U(W- cs, Q1 ) = U(W, O:!J such 
that E(CS) = (1-~)CS. Graham (1981, p. 72) demonstrates that the use of E(CS) 
to measure ex ante value is correct it and only if complete contingent claims 
markets exist. Marshall (1976) shows that such markets imply that risk must 
be exogenous. It follows that E(CS) does not vary with self-protection 
efforts. 
It adaptive self-protection is an efficient choice for the consumer, 
then, in accord with the argument surrounding (6), option price, as 
customarily defined, can be small or zero. A glance at (7) immediately 
reveals that a small or a zero option price causes a smaller or even a zero or 
a negative option value. It follows that large or even positive option values 
can exist- only when the individual is an inefficient self-protector, or if he 
is uninformed about opportunities tor self-protection. For example, large 
scale disasters such as the Chernobyl nuclear ac.cident do not creat.:e much 
opportunity for efficient adaptation through self-protection. Iodine cablets 
can be ingested to reduce the probability of illness, but in general private 
actions prove too expensive and complicated to be economically feasible. A 
collective agency may prove a more efficient.: provider given scale economies. 
In addition, if. the individual is uninformed about self-protection, he is more 
likely to demand collective provision. This demand would be reflected in a 
higher option price. In behavioral ecology terms, self-protection acts as 
the primary defense (e.g., crypsis) while collective action is a secondary 
defense (e.g., early warning) that is used as a back-up strategy [Barnard 
(1983)]. 
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If efficient self-protection is available, a collective agency may find 
it more cost-effective to provide information about the properties of or ways 
to acquire the desired good than to provide the desired good itself. In the 
case of radon gas, information programs have yielded promising results [see 
Smith and Johnson (1988)]. Indeed, public alarms that cause individuals to 
self-protect have long been observed in ecological systems. Warning signals 
in mammal herds and alarm calls among flock-forming birds are common examples. 
Rhoades (1983) and Baldwin and Schultz (1983) found evidence of airborne 
pheromonal releases from damaged plants that alerted undamaged plants and 
caused the latter to protect themselves from herbivore attacks. {See Charnov 
and Krebs (1975) for an alternative view of the manipulative, self-interested 
role of alarm calls.] 
The preceding results reenforce the findings of Freeman (1985) about 
ambiguities in the sign of supply-side option value when a residual 
uncertainty remains about the provision of the desirable state even after some 
collective act has been undertaken. However, Bishop (1982), Brookshire et al. 
(1983), and Freeman (1985), among others, have shown that, under conditions 
where adaptation is nonexistent, the sure provision of a collectively supplied 
desirable staee of nature results in a strictly positive option value for a 
risk averse individual. Even this single case of determinacy fails to hold 
when adaptation .through self-protection is available. For example, in che 
perfectly plausible case where E (CS) ~ s > OP, then ( 7) becomes 
OV = OP - E(CS) < 0. (8) 
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In the extreme case ~here the individual would prefer not to have any 
collective provision whatsoever, (7) is 
OV = -E(CS) < 0. ( 9) 
More generally, the individual's ability to adapt to uncertaincy through self-
protection implies that collectively supplied protection may be redundant, 
thereby providing no additional welfare benefits. 
SUHHARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although the ability to adapt and act independently on one's own behalf 
is a prominent feature of many, perhaps most, environmental and health and 
safety issues, its relevance to the determination of option value has not 
heretofore been explored. Our result indicates that just as ecology has 
profited from the insights of the economic theory of optimization, the option 
value literature can learn from the ecological ideas about adaptive self-
protection. The recognition of adaptability simply expands the number of 
circumstances in which the sign of option value, as traditionally defined, can 
be shown to be ambiguous. If various reasonable interdependencies (e.g., 
technical complementarities, price interactions) were introduced along with 
adaptation into the analysis, the list of cases with ambiguous signs would 
undoubtedly expand. Even the case of the sure provision of the desirable 
state, which the literature has predicted to possess a positive option value 
for collective provision, is easily shown to be unsignable when adaptive self-
protection is available. A cOmplete measure of ex ante value, therefore, must 
include both self-protection and collective option price expenditures. 
Otherwise, traditional bene!it-cost analysis will systematically underestimate 
the total vaLue of environmentaL resources characterized by uncertain supply. 
Footnotes 
11 Environmencal economists have also developed other current nonuser 
values for environmental resources. Existence value is the value an 
individual attaches to the mere existence of an environmental resource even 
though he will never use or visit the resource, Bequest value is the desire 
of current generations to ensure future generations have access to the 
resources {see Walsh et al. (1984)]. Of course, the environment has many 
other values such as scientific or religious, but economists have not yet 
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